

**Constitutionalist Public Administration Paradigm:
The Predominant Paradigm in the Regulatory Device OMB Circular A-76**

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Abstract

A Big Question for public administration scholarship is to what degree does (and should) our constitutional heritage influence our approach to administering the public sphere, and has this changed over time. Most scholarship addresses this from a normative theoretical perspective, with little empirical research to support its claims. I conduct a longitudinal content analysis of the regulatory device, OMB Circular A-76, from 1966 to 2003, looking for evidence of a change in *public administration paradigms* from a Constitutionalist Public Administration Paradigm to an Entrepreneurial Public Administration Paradigm. I find that the Constitutionalist Public Administration Paradigm is the predominant public administration paradigm in all the Circulars.

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A Big Question for *especially* American public administration scholarship is whether our constitutional heritage influences (or should influence) our approach to administering the public sphere. While the public administration scholarship of the European Union and other countries also addresses the role of their constitutionalist heritage (Bogdanor, 2009; Bovens and Yesilkagit, 2010; Christensen, 2010a; Christensen, 2010b; Flinders, 2008; Jenny & Müller, 2010; King, 2007; Müller, Bovens, Christensen, Jenny & Yesilkagit, 2010), American public administration has placed the question of the impact of the U.S. constitution central to the study of public administration since its inception.

Woodrow Wilson's place in American public administration has been lauded and challenged, especially his presentation of the politics-administration dichotomy. (Cook, 2007; Goodsell, 1984; Graham, 1993; Martin, 1988; Ostrom & Ostrom, 1971; Rosser, 2010) However, while it is not generally disputed, the fact that he firmly places the U.S. constitution at the center of the discussion of American public administration (Wilson, 1887) is also not as frequently the focus of the analyses of his ideas. Wilson significantly frames the future American treatment of public administration by placing the role of the constitution as a central focus in our approach to administering the public sector, laying the foundation for the role of the U.S. constitution as a Big Question in American public administration scholarship.

More recent Constitutionalist, those American public administration scholars who advocate for public administration practice to be guided by the U.S. constitution (Cooper, 2006; Feldman, 1993; Goodsell, 2004, 1984; Lee & Rosenbloom, 2005; Lowi, 1993; McSwite, 1997; Moe, 2004, 2001, 1997, 1990, Moe & Gilmour, 1995; Newbold, 2010; Rohr, 2002, 1998, 1995, 1993, 1989, 1986; Rosenbloom, 2003, 1983, 1971; Rosenbloom, Carroll & Carroll, 2000; Spicer & Terry, 1993a; Spicer & Terry, 1993b; Stivers, 1993; Wamsley et. al.,

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1990; Warren, 1993; Wise, 1993; Zinke, 1992) continue to hold a central role in American public administration scholarship. A few streams of this dialogue focus on the character of the founders (especially the moral implications of their owning slaves), the proper role and legitimacy of administration, and the rule of law. Of course, there are also critics of this approach. (Levison, 2006) Much of the Constitutionalist literature is from a normative theoretical perspective, with little empirical research to support its claims.

Related to whether our constitutional heritage influences our approach to administering the public sphere, is whether the public sector is managed (or should be managed) like the private sector. Again, Wilson (1887) frames this question for us, suggesting that administration is essentially the same across sectors. More recent scholarship in this area is both normative and descriptive, much of it seeking best practices. (Bishop & Connors, 2003; Hood, 1995; Lynn, 1996; Osborne & Gaebler, 1993; Osborne & Plastrik, 1997; Pollitt, 1998, 1996, 1993; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000)

Throughout the history of American public administration, *new* approaches to public management have waxed and waned in popularity, Pragmatism, Civil Service Reform, the Progressive Movement, Scientific Management, Budget Reform, Principles of Management, Bureaucracy as a Model of Efficiency, Behaviorism, New Public Administration, the Privatization Movement, Public Choice Theory, New Public Management, the Refounding Movement, Public Policy Emphasis, New Public Service, and now Collaborative Network Governance. Either directly or obliquely, the academic dialogues that have arisen around these trends wrestle both with whether our constitutional heritage should influence our approach to administering the public sphere, and also with whether the public sector should be managed like the private sector. Constitutionlists have sometimes led these reforms, as with the Refounding Movement, and at other times, have virulently rebutted it, as with New Public Management.

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I am interested in investigating whether the normative claim made by the Constitutionalists, that the U.S. constitution should guide administrative practice, is actually born out in the practice. Relatedly, I am interested in investigating whether we are administering our public sector like the private sector. I am also interested in whether there have been any recent changes in our approaches to administering the public sector.

For this, I turn to the work of Ronald C. Moe (2004, 2001, 1997, 1990) and to that of Moe and Robert S. Gilmour. (1995) They identify two public administration paradigms evident in the U.S. federal government, the Constitutionalist and the Entrepreneurial Paradigms. Moe and Moe and Gilmour argue that the Constitutionalist Public Administration Paradigm (CPAP) was the predominant paradigm of public administration from the origins of the republic through the late 1970s, and that by the 1990s, a new paradigm of administering government activity was taking hold across the globe, the Entrepreneurial Public Administration Paradigm (EPAP). Furthermore, they suggest these paradigms are pervasive. Much of the general discourse in public administration scholarship also proposes that they have been ubiquitous.

In order to investigate whether the practice of public administration has indeed been guided by pervasive public administration paradigms that Moe and Moe and Gilmour postulate to have changed during the 1980s, I analyze Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76 from 1966 to 2003. I conduct a longitudinal content analysis of OMB Circular A-76, from 1966 to 2003, looking for evidence of a change in *public administration paradigms* from a Constitutionalist Public Administration Paradigm to an Entrepreneurial Public Administration Paradigm. First I review my research design; next I present the analytical framework I developed to conduct the analysis; then I discuss the finding; and I conclude with implications for the field of public administration scholarship and practice.

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Research Design

I conduct a longitudinal content analysis of OMB Circular A-76, from 1966 to 2003, for evidence of a change in *public administration paradigms* from a Constitutionalist Public Administration Paradigm to an Entrepreneurial Public Administration Paradigm.

Research Proposition. OMB Circular A-76 from 1966 to 2003 reflects a change in public administration paradigms from a Constitutionalist Public Administration Paradigm to an Entrepreneurial Public Administration Paradigm. If the research proposition is supported, the following findings are expected. The Circulars published during the reign of the CPAP (1966, 1967 and 1979) will show evidence of that paradigm. The Circular written during the period of change in public administration paradigms (1983) will contain elements of both paradigms. Finally, the Circulars printed after the solidification of the EPAP (1999 and 2003) will reflect the new public administration paradigm.

Sampling Frame. The sampling frame for the research includes OMB Circular A-76, 1966, 1967, 1979, 1983, 1999, and 2003. OMB issues Circulars as one way of offering instructions or information to executive agencies, with Circulars expected to be in effect for two years or more. From 1966 to 2008, OMB Circular A-76 gave policy and procedures for determining whether the government or a private source would supply a commercially available product or service for the government's use. When the government planned to, or was interested in, providing a product or service for its own use that was also available from the private sector, a cost comparison was required to determine whether the government or a private source would provide the product or service. OMB Circular A-76 gave direction regarding these cost comparisons. Therefore, Circular A-76 was applicable only when the government was interested in providing a commercially available product or service for its own use. Both governmental provision and governmental consumption were essential. If either of these conditions was not present, Circular A-76 did not apply. When the

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government was not interested in providing a commercially available product or service for its own use, procedures for determining the private provider fell under procurement guidelines such as the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR).

Also, A-76 is the series of primary source U.S. federal executive branch documents with the longest history that most thoroughly address the meaning of inherently governmental. The notion of inherently governmental addresses the fundamental question of what is the relationship and boundary between the public and private sectors and what a government must do, may do, and must not do. The concept of inherently governmental is central to the normative perspective that the U.S. constitution should guide public administrative practice. It is also central to the related debate about whether the public and private sectors should be managed similarly. While the meaning of inherently governmental is not the primary focus of this analysis, it is important to note that there is no U.S. federal document that addresses the meaning of what constitutes inherently governmental activity as its primary focus. A-76 addresses the U.S. policy on what constitutes inherently governmental indirectly as it directly focuses on government's policy and procedures for issuing cost comparisons for products and services it planned to use. It is however, the U.S. federal executive branch document with the longest history that most thoroughly addresses the meaning of what constitutes inherently governmental activity.

In choosing a data set to analyze for the evidence of Constitutionalist and Entrepreneurial Public Administrative Paradigms, I reasoned that if there has been a pervasive change in public administration paradigms from a Constitutional to an Entrepreneurial perspective, that it indeed would be likely to be evident in the regulatory device, A-76, which is the series of federal executive branch documents that directly addresses the government's policy for issuing cost comparisons for products and services it planned to use. A-76 directed executive agencies to issue cost comparisons for products and

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services it planned to use. The government is not to produce products and services for its own consumption without verifying the private sector is not interested in or can not competitively provide these products and services. Intuitively, this is a very entrepreneurial activity. Asking the government to issue competitive cost comparisons certainly brings market forces into the process, an entrepreneurial focus. Directing executive agencies to issue competitive cost comparisons for products and services they planned to consume appears very entrepreneurial. A-76 is also the series of primary source U.S. federal executive branch documents with the longest history that most thoroughly addresses the meaning of what constitutes inherently governmental activity. If there has been a pervasive change in public administration paradigms from a Constitutional to an Entrepreneurial perspective, it would be likely to be evident in the document that indirectly addresses the concept of inherently governmental.

The Omnibus Appropriations Act 2009 banned new cost comparisons under A-76 and the 2012 Financial Services Appropriations Act continues the ban. Therefore, the current Congress and Obama administration do not support competitive cost comparisons as outlined in A-76. However, this study is not an examination of the effectiveness of A-76. I analyze A-76 as an administrative artifact for evidence of Constitutionalist and Entrepreneurial paradigms, and for this purpose, the current ban does not compromise the research design.

I suggest that public administrative practice produces public administrative artifacts. In this case, the public administrative practice of articulating and implementing policies and procedures for directing executive agencies to issue cost comparisons for products and services it planned to use produced the public administrative artifact, OMB Circular A-76. I further suggest that public administration scholarship can examine these administrative artifacts for evidence of public administration theory. In this case, I examine the public administrative artifact, OMB Circular A-76 for evidence of the public administration

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paradigms.

[Insert Figure 1 here]

Reviewing OMB documents focuses the study on the executive branch of the U.S. government. Both the legislative and judicial branches of the U.S. federal government also directly and indirectly participate in the evolution of the meaning of inherently governmental in the United States. Congress is directly involved in the definition of inherently governmental through various statutes such as the Federal Activity Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act and also through the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). The legislative branch indirectly impacts the meaning of inherently governmental through its role in establishing agencies, confirming political appointees, funding appropriations for specific agencies and programs, and providing programmatic oversight. While Circulars are issued by OMB, and formally authored by the OMB Director, individual members of Congress have leveraged their political capital and directly influenced numerous procedures within the Circular. Additionally, the judicial branch engages the process of defining inherently governmental directly through its role in defining state action and the adjudication of these cases as well as its review of contractor claims by the Comptroller General. More indirectly, the judiciary influences the meaning of inherently governmental through reviews of executive action that holds executive branch managers legally accountable for maintaining procedural safeguards in dealing with both citizens and employees. The federal courts also hold agencies accountable for conforming to legislative deadlines and substantive standards.

Research Methodology. I utilized a longitudinal content analysis of a series of government documents from their primary source to investigate OMB A-76 for evidence of a change in public administration paradigms from a Constitutionalist to an Entrepreneurial Public Administration Paradigm. I identified units of analysis and theoretically informed

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categories, and reviewed the text of the Circulars for evidence of the defined categories. The unit of analysis is a phrase. First, I reviewed each Circular for evidence of the characteristics of the two public administration paradigms using thresholds that reflect clear and convincing levels of evidence. Traditional social science methodology and evidentiary thresholds provides little guidance for conceptualizing paradigmatic predominance and establishing data limits. I turn to U.S. legal standards of proof as conceptual guidelines for determining paradigm predominance. In U.S. legal standards of proof, preponderance of evidence is met if a proposition is more likely to be true than not true. Effectively, the standard is satisfied if there is greater than 50 percent chance that the proposition is true. Clear and convincing evidence is a higher level of persuasion that means the evidence is highly and substantially more probable to be true than not and leads to a firm belief or conviction in its factuality. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the highest standard used as the burden of proof in Anglo-American jurisprudence and indicates there is no plausible reason to believe otherwise. Conceptually, paradigmatic predominance seems congruent with clear and convincing evidence, and I set the data threshold at 75 percent. Therefore, a paradigm characteristic is reported as predominant when 75 percent or more of the data was found in one characteristic. The Circular is reported as being influenced by both characteristics when 26 percent to 74 percent of entries reflect a characteristic. Finally, the Circular is reported as showing no characteristic when no phrases for either characteristic were found. Using the same thresholds, I then examined each Circular for evidence of a predominant public administration paradigm. A Circular is reported as indicating evidence of a predominant paradigm when 75 percent or more of phrases reveal that paradigm. Both public administration paradigms are concluded to be present when 26 percent to 74 percent of phrases reflect one of the paradigms. It is possible to have a Circular indicate overall

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evidence of one public administration paradigm while also showing evidence of a characteristic of the alternate paradigm.

Analytical Framework

I developed an analytical framework that synthesizes Moe's and Moe and Gilmour's ideas about the public administration paradigms and expands their conceptualization by incorporating additional information from the Gore Report. I chose these sources because they most thoroughly describe the two paradigms.

In the resulting analytic framework, I describe seven essential and interrelated characteristics of each paradigm. I chose the seven characteristics based on their value in adding conceptual clarity. The seven characteristics do not necessarily encompass every feature of the paradigms and the order of the characteristics implies neither the strength of the characteristic relative to the other characteristics, nor a logical progression. I ordered the characteristics based on descriptive value.

I then operationalized the seven characteristics of each paradigm into nominal criteria that I used to analyze the documents. Content analysis, the research design and method used in this study, requires that each criterion be uniquely assigned to one characteristic. Therefore, each criterion is unique and is listed only once in the analytical framework. This operationalization forced choices regarding the categorization of criteria. I assigned criterion to characteristics based on the placement's ability to facilitate conceptual clarity and its utility to the analysis.

[Insert Table 1 here]

The Constitutionalist Public Administration Paradigm. The Constitutionalist Public Administration Paradigm is theoretically based, values driven, structure dependent, promotes

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sectoral distinctions, deductive, strategic, and normative. The prominent or *core characteristic* of the CPAP is that it is a *theoretically based* perspective of public administration, *grounded in the U.S. Constitution*. According to Moe and to Moe and Gilmour, political theory directly informs the remaining six characteristics of this public administration paradigm. Moe does not specifically define political theory and I maintain his use of political theory in the description of the CPAP. Moe uses the phrase political theory to include the eleven nominal criteria for the theoretically based characteristic of the CPAP. The theoretically based characteristic of the CPAP poses a particular challenge to the design of the analytical framework. The framework functions in a dual capacity. It structures a comparison of the two public administration paradigms; and in this function, my goal is to maximize the descriptive value of the characteristics. It also operationalizes these characteristics into nominal criteria used in the analysis; and in this function, my goal is to maximize the integrity of the research design, which includes listing criteria only once. The challenge is that the theoretically based characteristic informs the other six characteristics, and this could potentially lead to duplicate listings for the criteria. The way I address this challenge is to list the specific theories as nominal criteria in the theoretically based characteristic. In the analysis, only direct mentions of theory are attributed to the theoretically based characteristic. This method maintains the standard of uniqueness for the criteria in the seven characteristics.

As with Moe's use of the phrase political theory, I use theory as Moe and Moe and Gilmour use it. I use their references to, and nomenclature for theories, as well as their descriptions of specific aspects of the theories they mention. Although Moe (1994) defines theory as propositions subject to empirical proof or disproof, he does not assess this definition of theory against his usage of it. I employ this definition and list it as the *first nominal criterion* for the theoretically based characteristic of the CPAP. In my view, Moe's

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definition of theory is too narrow; theory can be normative as well as empirical and analytical. However, here my goal is to present the public administration paradigms as Moe and as Moe and Gilmour present them and as expanded by the Gore Report so that I can then analyze the documents in the sampling frame for evidence of their predominance.

The *second nominal criterion* for the theoretically based characteristic is the CPAP's grounding in the U.S. Constitution and the political theory that directed its formation and continues to inform its enduring guidance of the United States government. If there are tensions or conflicts with the activities of governing, they are resolved by the authority of the U.S. Constitution. (Moe, 2004, 2001, 1997, 1990; Moe & Gilmour, 1995) Moe (2004) defines the fundamental theoretical basis of the American polity as including three theoretical values or governance principles. Governance principle one suggests that the institutions of government shall be divided among three co-equal branches, the legislative, executive, and judicial, and these branches shall be at once institutionally separate and interdependent. Governance principle two requires all administrative functions to be located within the executive branch and responsible to the President and through the latter accountable to Congress. Governance principle three notes that there shall be a governmental sector (agents of the sovereign) and a private sector and they shall be kept separate and function under distinct theories of jurisprudence. The theory of the accountable executive, which includes an integrated executive branch, institutionalized presidency and strong central executive administration agencies as essential to strong public administration is related to these three governance principles and is listed with them in the framework. Together these form the *third nominal criterion* for the theoretically based characteristic of the CPAP.

The fundamental difference between the public and private sectors is based in the legal theory of constitutional government, and legally based administrative theory is its direct consequence. (Moe, 1997) These are the *fourth and fifth nominal criteria*, respectively. The

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sixth and seventh nominal criteria for the theoretically based characteristic of the CPAP include public administration theory that equates public and government organizations and the view that government administration is a distinct field with its own long-tested theoretical basis. (Moe, 1997)

Moe and Gilmour (1995) outline ten “historically fundamental principles of public administration,” which are generalizations that have been collectively viewed as axiomatic.

The principles provide a general theoretical framework for public administration:

1. The purpose of agency administration is to implement the laws passed by Congress as elected representatives of the people.
2. The president is the chief executive officer of the executive branch and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and as such is responsible for the execution of the laws.
3. Executive branch managers are held legally accountable by reviewing courts for maintaining procedural safeguards in dealing with both citizens and employees and for conforming to legislative deadlines and substantive standards.
4. Political accountability for the implementation of policy and law requires a clear line of authority from the president to the heads of the departments and agencies and from them to their subordinates.
5. Policy and program objectives specifically agreed to and incorporated into enabling legislation, subject to reasonable and articulate standards of measurement and compliance, facilitate effective implementation.
6. The congruence of statutory responsibility for policy or program performance and administrative authority and resources makes possible the achievement of statutory objectives.
7. Authority and responsibility for policy and program performance are located with certainty in single administrators, not in plural executives, interagency committees, or representative boards.
8. Public accountability requires that inherently governmental functions and tasks be preformed by officers of the United States and their government-employed subordinates.
9. Departures from the principles of government organization are made only when functions to be performed or truly exceptional circumstances require them and when political and legal accountability are otherwise ensured.
10. Executive administration capacity is increased by regular reviews of general and specific administration laws and regulations to incorporate the best available government sector administration practices and to eliminate requirements and practices that are no longer relevant or productive.

These ten principles are incorporated in the analytical framework as the *eighth nominal criterion* for the theoretically based characteristic of the CPAP.

Additionally, and included as the *ninth nominal criterion*, Moe and Gilmour (1995) refer to the theory guiding government organization and administration that informs the

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structures, processes and procedures of government and has a foundation in public law. Moe (1994) also indicates that reports about governmental organization and administration such as those by presidential commissions are based on a theory about the nature of government and its administration. This theory often is assumed in the report's recommendations. This is the *tenth nominal criterion*. Finally, and the *eleventh nominal criterion* of the theoretically based characteristic of the CPAP, Moe (1994) refers to the American theory of government as including the separation of powers and doctrine of nondelegation of governmental functions to private parties.

The second characteristic of the CPAP is *values driven*, specifically prioritizing democratic, political and administrative values within government administration. In addition, the CPAP is *structure dependent* in two ways. It is dependent upon the governmental structure of three separate and co-equal branches of government as outlined in the first three Articles of the U.S. Constitution. According to this characteristic, Congress establishes executive agencies, articulates their missions, passes enabling and administration legislation related to their operation, passes funding appropriations, provides program and administration oversight, and has the authority to dissolve agencies. Also according to this characteristic, the CPAP is based on the theory of the accountable executive, advocating an institutionalized presidency, unified executive branch, and strong central administration agencies. From this perspective, executive branch directors report directly to the President, ensuring directors operate within appropriate legal authority and remain politically accountable to elected officials. Also from this vantage point, the judicial branch provides additional oversight. The CPAP is also dependent upon organizational structure. Nonpartisan professional managers ensure an institutional perspective. Hierarchical reporting within an agency and standardized procedures ensure the values of the CPAP are met.

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Furthermore, the CPAP *promotes sectoral distinctions*, prescribing a strict distinction between the public and private sectors based on the sovereignty of the state. This is its fourth characteristic in the analytic framework. The analytical framework includes several criteria that reflect this characteristic: sovereignty, inherently governmental functions, and jurisprudence. All sovereign functions must be assigned to the government, and some context-relevant secondary functions also may be assigned to the public sector. “What is essential to governmental character is its exercise of sovereign authority under the Constitution, its interactions with citizens in a framework of popular sovereignty and limited government.” (Moe, 1997, p. 43) In Moe’s view, sovereignty includes several fundamental attributes. It always involves the legitimate right to use coercion, immunity from suit except by its own permission, and indivisibility. It also includes the right to disavow debts but does not include the right to declare bankruptcy, which is a private right. Further, it encompasses the right of eminent domain. (Moe, 1987) The second criterion in the analytical framework that indicates the promotion of sectorial distinctions is the concept of inherently governmental. According to Moe, sovereign functions should be assigned to the government through a legal process that holds government officials accountable for their decisions. “Assignment of functions between the sectors is not simply an economic exercise to find the most economical choice, but first and foremost it is a legal exercise in which the values of accountability of officers of the United States are spelled out in law.” (Moe, 1997, p. 42) Government officials must perform all functions that involve the power of the sovereign. In addition to sovereignty, the government may include secondary criteria when deciding if a function is public, such as providing for national security, ensuring public safety, retaining sufficient knowledge to manage contracts and limiting corruption. These secondary criteria depend on context. The third criterion that indicates the promotion of sectorial distinctions is the concept of jurisprudence. Public and private law are separate in the United States,

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representing distinct jurisprudences and governed by separate bodies of law. Public law is based on a restrictive jurisprudence in which government action must be expressly permitted within the law, and private law is based on a more permissive jurisprudence, allowing private citizen action unless specifically restrained by the law. Executive agencies are subject to public law that is comprised of the Constitution, Bill of Rights, statutory, regulatory, and case law. Executive agencies are also governed by Title Five of the U.S. Code. The goal of public law is to ensure the continuance of a republican form of government and protect the rights and freedoms of citizens. It makes the public sector distinct from the private sector in the United States. The private sector is founded in a different legal doctrine of judge-made common law that protects the rights and responsibilities of private individuals. (Moe & Gilmour, 1995)

Finally, the CPAP is *deductive, strategic* and *normative*, its fifth, sixth, and seventh characteristics in the framework, respectively. It is deductive in that it begins with theory, and all administrative decisions follow from that theory. The vision and purpose of government guide governmental decisions, how they are practically implemented and what governmental actions are taken. It is strategic in that it is based on long-range and broad goals. The CPAP also is normative in two ways. It is normative in that it is based on what has been done historically. Tradition holds a hallowed space in the CPAP. It also is normative in that it bounds decisions and actions by establishing and maintaining expectations for those decisions and actions. In this way it is standardizing and evaluative, defining what should be done.

The Entrepreneurial Public Administration Paradigm. The second public administration paradigm that Moe and Moe and Gilmour describe, the Entrepreneurial Public Administration Paradigm rose to prominence in the 1990s. Globally, the privatization movement brought a focus on new methods of governing, a New Public Management (NPM).

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In 1993, the Report of the National Performance Review (NPR) titled “From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government that Works Better and Costs Less,” commonly referred to as the Gore Report (Gore, 1993) solidified its prominence in the U.S. The Gore Report translated the globally implemented New Public Management movement into a distinctively American version of NPM that does not utilize public choice language, as do many of its international cousins. It relies on an explicit business model and discourse, making “reinventing government” a buzz phrase. (Moe, 2004) The EPAP is pragmatically based, results driven, structure independent, promotes sectoral blurring, inductive, tactical, and descriptive.

Whereas the CPAP is explicitly theoretically based, the first defining characteristic of the EPAP is that it is *pragmatically based*. The Entrepreneurial Public Administration Paradigm is pragmatically based because it relies on the NPR’s review of what currently was working for successful organizations in both the public and private sectors. It is based on the twin missions of the NPR that were to create a government that works better and costs less, focusing on how government operates, not what government should do. “Our job was to improve performance in areas where policymakers had already decided government should play a role.” (Gore, 1993, p. ii) Even though Moe (1997) acknowledges the EPAP has its origins in the discipline of economics, he views this as different from the strong theoretical roots of the CPAP. For him, the Entrepreneurial Public Administration Paradigm “fail[s] to provide the theoretical comprehensiveness necessary to ensure that the basic political values of American democracy are met.” (43) What masquerades as theorizing in the EPAP is actually the stringing together of aphorisms; the EPAP calls for nostrums rather than tested theory. (Moe, 1997)

The prominent or *core characteristic* of the EPAP is that it is *results driven*. It primarily focuses on organizational outcomes. The first NPR principle, “Cutting Red Tape”

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focuses on systemic changes. It advocates creating budget, personnel and procurement systems reoriented to prevention, innovation and deregulation. The two governing approaches fundamentally differ in that they have inverted relationships between laws and organizational outcomes. The Constitutionalist Public Administration Paradigm places laws first in importance. In the CPAP, administrative practices flow from laws. If one is incongruent with the other, or a change is proposed in organizational outcomes, laws are first changed. This makes the CPAP more process focused than outcome focused. Means are equally as important as ends in the CPAP. (Moe, 1994) In the CPAP, the public administrator serves to implement the laws. In contrast, in the Entrepreneurial Public Administration Paradigm, organizational outcomes are of supreme importance. In the face of incongruence in laws and organizational outcomes or a proposed change in organizational outcomes, administrative practices are changed, which may involve ignoring or disobeying laws. As a secondary focus, laws may or may not be changed to support the new organizational outcomes. In the EPAP, results, outcomes and ends are more important than processes and means. For the EPAP the central issue for public administration is ensuring the legal system works to the advantage of the federal manager. (Moe, 1994)

The Gore Report espouses a commitment to democratic values and positions its recommendations as a means of preserving these values.

To deliver what the people want, we need not to jettison the traditional values that underlie democratic governance – values such as equal opportunity, justice, diversity, and democracy. We hold these values dear. We seek to transform bureaucracies precisely *because* they have failed to nurture these values. We believe that those who resist change for fear of jeopardizing our democratic values doom us to a government that continues – through its failures – to subvert those very values. (Gore, 1993, p. 8)

Echoing the politics-administration dichotomy, Gore treats values as appropriate to the realm of politics that guide and inform management, but not an integral part of the management of government. Therefore it is not an essential characteristic of the EPAP.

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The EPAP is also *structure independent*, independent of both governmental and organizational structure. Agencies are encouraged to articulate their own visions and work through interagency committees. Along with other factors, an era of the personalized presidency has brought about a disaggregated executive branch. Public-private partnerships, quasi-governmental hybrid organizations, and government-sponsored enterprises are more common than a single agency providing a service. Power is decentralized to create a culture of empowering workers to make decisions. The third NPR principle, “Empowering Employees to Get Results,” promotes performance results through employee empowerment and the fourth principle, “Cutting Back to Basics: Producing Better Government for Less,” advocates economic results by reengineering work processes.

The EPAP also *promotes sectorial blurring*. The public and private sectors are considered alike in the essentials. This completely changes the dialogue about what functions should be inherently governmental. No one or even several characteristics inclusively define the new public-private partnerships and quasi-governmental hybrid organizations, which are nominal criteria for the previous EPAP characteristic; yet they all share one critical excluding factor. None is governed by Title Five of the U.S. Code. They are instead guided by a commingling of public and private jurisprudence systems. To some degree they act on behalf of the sovereign and to some degree they act as private entities. Government sponsored enterprises have especially blurred lines. (Moe, 2004, 2001) The NPR principle two, “Putting Customers First,” utilizes market dynamics with both customers and employees. Customer choice introduces a market mechanism to customers, and competition introduces a market mechanism to create incentives for employees.

The NPR reviewed successful public and private organizations as a way of describing how successful organizations operated, not what they should do. For this reason, the Entrepreneurial Public Administration Paradigm is *inductive, tactical* and *descriptive*. The

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CPAP is deductive while the EPAP is inductive. The CPAP is grounded in political theory and the U.S. Constitution. All of the details of administration follow from this theoretical grounding. The vision and purpose of government guide the specifics of governmental decisions, how they are practically implemented and what governmental actions are taken. In contrast, the EPAP is inductive, rooted in a practical examination of governmental action. Program implementation defines organizational vision and actions already taken shape future organizational purpose. Political theory is not mentioned and must be inferred from the aggregate sum of the actions advocated. Where there is incongruence between theory and action, the CPAP remains true to theory and accepts inefficiencies in implementation. On the other hand, the EPAP is committed to efficient results and pays less attention to discrepancies between theory and action. Additionally, the EPAP is tactical in that it focuses on current and specific short-term outcomes and objectives. It also is descriptive because it describes current successes and makes no attempt to apply normative criteria other than the organization's economic success. Table 2 gives a sample of the data indicators used when coding the circulars.

[Insert Table 2 here]

Findings

The research proposition was not supported. The Constitutionalist Public Administration Paradigm is the predominant public administration paradigm in all the Circulars. Although all the Circulars show evidence of the CPAP, all also have at least one characteristic of the EPAP that is predominant. The research proposition posited that the Circulars published during the hypothesized reign of the Constitutionalist Public Administration Paradigm (1966, 1967 and 1979) would exhibit evidence of that paradigm. Indeed, this is the case: the CPAP is predominant in each. Furthermore, these three Circulars

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have the same pattern of predominant characteristics. Each displays five predominant CPAP characteristics: structure dependent, promotes sector distinctions, deductive, strategic, and normative. However, each also show a predominance of the EPAP characteristic, pragmatically based; and none include a predominance of the CPAP characteristic values driven or the EPAP characteristic, result driven.

The research proposition also predicted that the Circular written in 1983 during the postulated period of change in public administration paradigms would contain elements of both paradigms. This was not found: the CPAP remains predominant. However, the 1983 Circular does exhibit a change in the pattern of predominant characteristics. It maintains the pattern of the previous three Circulars with one exception: there is no predominance of either the CPAP characteristic, deductive or the EPAP characteristic, inductive. The 1983 Circular, then, demonstrates predominance for four CPAP characteristics: structure dependent, promotes sector distinctions, strategic, and normative. Like the previous Circulars, it also shows the EPAP characteristic, pragmatically based is also predominant and indicates no predominance of the CPAP characteristic, values driven or the EPAP characteristic, result driven.

Furthermore, the research proposition suggested that the Circulars printed after the hypothesized solidification of the Entrepreneurial Public Administration Paradigm (1999 and 2003) would reflect the new paradigm. This also was not supported: both show evidence of the CPAP. The 1999 Circular has the same pattern of characteristic predominance as the 1983 Circular.

The 2003 Circular displays the greatest change in the pattern of characteristics. Circular 2003 shows predominance for two CPAP characteristics, structure dependent and normative. It also exhibits predominance for two EPAP characteristics, pragmatically based and inductive. Additionally, no predominance appears for the CPAP characteristic, values

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driven, or the EPAP characteristic, result driven. There also is no predominance of the CPAP characteristic, sector distinctions or the EPAP characteristic sector blurring. Finally, no predominance is found in the 2003 Circulars for the CPAP characteristic, strategic or the EPAP characteristic, tactical. Therefore, Circular 2003 has two predominant CPAP characteristics and two predominant EPAP characteristics; it is reported as indicating evidence of a predominant CPAP paradigm because more than 75% (79%) or more of phrases reveal that paradigm. Paradigm predominance is based on total number of phrases, not number of characteristics.

[Insert Table 3 and Chart 1 here]

Two possible conditions may help explain why the research proposition was not supported. First, there may have been no change in public administration paradigms and the Circulars reflect that stability. The data indicate an increase in the influence of the EPAP in OMB Circular A-76 in from 1983 (13%) to 2003 (21%), although there is actually a decrease in the influence of the EPAP in 1983 from previous levels (1966 is 23%; 1967 and 1979 are 25%) This increase in the EPAP by 2003 cannot be generalized past the Circulars. It does, however, raise the question whether the premise of a change in public administration paradigms is in error. If there has not been a change in public administration paradigms, it is certainly possible that there has been some increase in influence of the EPAP, especially most recently, but possibly not to the degree postulated by Moe and by Moe and Gilmour and elaborated upon in the Gore Report, and not to the level of a generalized public administration paradigm.

Alternatively, of course, it is possible that there has been a change in public administration paradigms as Moe and as Moe and Gilmour postulate and as elaborated upon

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in the Gore Report, and OMB A-76 does not reflect that change. The nature of the Circular may predispose it to being consistent with the CPAP. OMB is a strong central management agency and Circulars state governmental policy and give implementation instructions to executive agencies; these are all indicators of the CPAP. However, the topic of the Circulars, the performance of commercial activities, may be distinctly indicative of the EPAP. Therefore, if there has indeed been a change in public administration paradigms, but the Circulars do not reflect that change, one explanation is that the OMB context of producing and the process of implementing policy outlined in the Circular is more likely to be governed by the CPAP; while its content, the policy and procedures for determining whether the government or a private source will supply a commercially available product or service for the government's use, is more likely to be governed by the EPAP. If this is the case, then the impact of the OMB context of producing and the process of implementing policy outlined in the Circular is more evident than the impact of the subject matter in the Circulars. In other words, the Constitutionalist Public Administration Paradigm influences the way in which the entrepreneurial policy is administered.

Implications

This study has implication for both public administration scholarship as well as practice. Especially for American public administration scholarship, a Big Question is to what degree does (and should) our constitutional heritage influence our approach to administering the public sphere, and has this changed over time. Most scholarship addresses this from a normative theoretical perspective; there has been little empirical research to support its claims. This study begins to close this research gap by providing one empirical analysis. Although the results cannot be generalized beyond OMB Circular A-76, it is worth noting that the Constitutionalist Public Administration Paradigm is the predominant public

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administration paradigm from 1966 – 2003 in the series of U.S. federal executive branch documents that (1) directly addresses the government’s policy and procedures for issuing cost comparisons for products and services it planned to use and; (2) with the longest history that most thoroughly addresses the meaning of what constitutes inherently governmental activity.

Perhaps there is incongruence between our public administration paradigms that govern our policy discussions, our espoused paradigms, and our public administration paradigms that govern our policy implementation, our paradigms – in – use. (Argyris, 1999) OMB A-76 both articulates policy and issues implementation instructions, so it is possible that it reflects both an *espoused public administration paradigm* and an operationalized or *enacted public administration paradigm*. In A-76, perhaps the Constitutionalist Public Administration Paradigm influences the way in which the entrepreneurial policy is administered. This is a question for future research.

As our world has become increasingly global, and our scholarship has become increasingly international, public administration scholarship must wrestle with the appropriate balance of nationally focused studies and cross-national analyses. Both are essential and vital to a robust discipline. This study is an American study. While American public administration scholarship places the role of the U.S. constitution as a guiding principle at the center of the discussion of administering the public sphere, it is by no means a topic unique to the U.S. Many cross-national studies are founded on strong national level research. So, while the question of constitutionality is essentially a question of national (or European Union) focus; it is a topic of interest shared by many liberal democratic states. Future cross-national research into the influence of jurisprudence, federalism and governmental structure, and institutional perspectives upon privatization and management paradigms would be fruitful for public administration. A cross-national and critical analysis

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of the American claim that constitutionality is especially important to the U.S. would also be fruitful to the larger public administration profession.

At a broader level, the exercise of conducting empirical analyses to investigate the evidence of normative claims in public administration scholarship is important. Very appropriately, public administration scholarship is one area of research that is strongly influenced by normative theory. While there is also a rich body of empirical research in public administration, little of it assesses the implementation of normative theory. While it is important to debate our normative views, it is also important to know if these normative views articulated in scholarship actually guide the practice of public administration. When there are discrepancies between our normative views and our practice, it is important to consider why this may be and what its implications are for the theory and practice of public administration.

In light of the Omnibus Appropriations Act 2009 banning new cost comparisons under A-76 and the 2012 Financial Services Appropriations Act continuing the ban, much political rhetoric has focused on the ways A-76 competition impacts the public interests, especially the cost effectiveness of government. In the December 22, 2011 of the Government Executive, Rob Burton, an administrator at OMB's Office of Federal Procurement Policy during the Bush era advocates the opposite view, indicating that the ban on A-76 competitions are "not in the taxpayers' best interest...This goes hand in hand with the Obama administration's insourcing initiative by prohibiting agencies from engaging in robust public-private competition...A-76 is based on competition and transparency, and in the last couple of years we have moved into an era when we make these decisions on what is cost-effective with no competition or transparency." (www.goveexec.com) In the same issue, Senator Barbara Mikulski, Democrat – Maryland comments, "I'm proud of the work that we've done for our federal employees, but the job isn't over. Continuing efforts to prevent

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outsourcing and contracting out is important both for American taxpayers and our federal employees." (www.goveexec.com) She is including the morale of public servants in her assessment of the impact of A-76 cost comparisons.

The efficiency and morale of public servants are often a fulcrum for political rhetoric, so her comment is not especially unique in that respect. What is interesting in light of this study is that perhaps the incongruence between the political rhetoric and the ways the policy is applied may also impact morale of public servants. This study supports future research into this and similar areas to investigate the impacts of such incongruence in our political rhetoric and the ways we implement policy. For public administrative practice, it is important to know that there may have been incongruence in the entrepreneurial rhetoric of U.S. federal policy directing government contracting for products and services it used, and the more constitutional way in which the policy was actually implemented.

Figure 1

**Examining Public Administrative Artifacts
For Evidence of
Public Administration Theory**




Table 1
The Constitutionalist Public Administration Paradigm and The Entrepreneurial Public Administration Paradigm
An Analytical Framework

Constitutionalist Public Administration Paradigm	Entrepreneurial Public Administration Paradigm
<p>CPAP Characteristic 1: Theoretically Based</p> <p><u>Nominal Criteria:</u></p> <p>Theory consists of propositions subject to empirical proof/disproof (Moe 1994)</p> <p>The U.S. Constitution (Moe 2004, 2001, 1997, 1990; Moe and Gilmour 1995)</p> <p>3 Governance Principles / Theoretical Values define the fundamental theoretical basis of the American polity (Moe 2004)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Theory of the Accountable Executive <p>Legal theory of constitutional government (Moe 1997)</p> <p>Legally based administrative theory (Moe 1997)</p> <p>Public administration theory equates public organizations with government organizations (Moe 1997)</p> <p>Government management is a separable field with its own long-tested theoretical basis. (Moe 1997)</p> <p>10 Principles of Public Administration form the theoretical framework for managing government (Moe and Gilmour 1995)</p> <p>Theory guiding government organization and management grounded in public law (Moe and Gilmour 1995)</p> <p>Theory about the nature of government and its management assumed in recommendations of reports about organization and management of government (Moe 1994)</p> <p>American theory of government includes the doctrines of separation of powers and nondelegation of governmental functions to private parties (Moe 1994)</p>	<p>EPAP Characteristic 1: Pragmatically Based</p> <p><u>Nominal Criteria:</u></p> <p>Based on successful organizations</p> <p>NPR twin missions: Government that</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Works Better • Costs Less <p>Focuses on how government operates, not what government should do</p>

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Constitutionalist Public Administration Paradigm	Entrepreneurial Public Administration Paradigm
<p>CPAP Characteristic 2: Values Driven</p> <p><u>Nominal Criteria:</u></p> <p>Democratic values</p> <p>Political values</p> <p>Administrative values</p>	<p>EPAP Characteristic 2: Results Driven</p> <p><u>Nominal Criteria:</u></p> <p>Organizational Outcomes</p> <p><i>NPR Principle # 1. Cutting Red Tape</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>Performance Results</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Systemic Changes <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Creates control systems to achieve results <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Budget ▪ Personnel ▪ Procurement ○ Creates control systems reoriented toward <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Prevention ▪ Innovation ▪ Deregulation

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Constitutionalist Public Administration Paradigm	Entrepreneurial Public Administration Paradigm
<p>CPAP Characteristic 3: Structure Dependent</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Governmental Structure Dependent</p> <p><u>Nominal Criteria:</u></p> <p>Constitutionally defined roles and relationships of 3 branches of government</p> <p>Congress creates agencies, establishes their missions, passes enabling and management legislation, provides oversight, passes appropriations and dissolves</p> <p>Institutionalized Presidency</p> <p>Unified executive branch</p> <p>Strong central administration agency (OMB)</p> <p>Agency directors report to the President</p> <p>Courts provide judicial review</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Organizational Structure Dependent</p> <p><u>Nominal Criteria:</u></p> <p>Nonpartisan professional managers</p> <p>Hierarchical</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Legal authority to administrators • Politically accountable to elected officials <p>Standardized Procedures</p>	<p>EPAP Characteristic 3: Structure Independent</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Governmental Structure Independent</p> <p><u>Nominal Criteria:</u></p> <p>Agencies articulate their own visions and missions</p> <p>Interagency committees</p> <p>Personalized Presidency</p> <p>Disaggregated executive branch</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Organizational Structure Independent</p> <p><u>Nominal Criteria:</u></p> <p>Public-private partnerships</p> <p>Quasi-governmental hybrid organizations</p> <p>Government sponsored enterprises</p> <p>Decentralizes authority and creates cultures to empower employees to make decisions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>NPR Principle # 3. Empowering Employees to Get Results</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ <u>Performance Results</u> <p>Reengineers work processes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>NPR Principle # 4. Cutting Back to Basics: Producing Better Government for Less</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ <u>Economic Results</u>

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<p style="text-align: center;">Constitutionalist Public Administration Paradigm</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Entrepreneurial Public Administration Paradigm</p>
<p>CPAP Characteristic 4: Promotes Sectoral Distinctions</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Public Sector</p> <p><u>Nominal Criteria:</u></p> <p>Sovereignty: fundamental attributes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Legitimate coercion • Immunity from suit • Indivisibility • Disavows debts • Eminent domain <p>Inherently governmental functions performed by government</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All functions of sovereign • National security • Public safety • Manage contracts • Limiting corruption <p>Public law</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensure continuance of republican government • Protect rights and freedom of citizens • Title 5 of U.S. Code • Presumption that law defines permission for government action <p style="text-align: center;">Private Sector</p> <p><u>Nominal Criteria:</u></p> <p>Private law</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Presumption that citizens are free to act unless prohibited by law 	<p>EPAP Characteristic 4: Promotes Sectoral Blurring</p> <p><u>Nominal Criteria:</u></p> <p><i>NPR Principle # 2. Putting Customers First</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Utilizes market dynamics with customers and employees <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Customer choice introduces a market mechanism to customers • Competition introduces a market mechanism to create incentives for employees

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Constitutionalist Public Administration Paradigm	Entrepreneurial Public Administration Paradigm
<p>CPAP Characteristic 5: Deductive</p> <p><u>Nominal Criteria:</u></p> <p>Vision guides implementation Purpose shapes actions</p>	<p>EPAP Characteristic 5: Inductive</p> <p><u>Nominal Criteria:</u></p> <p>Program implementation defines organizational vision Actions shape organizational purpose</p>
<p>CPAP Characteristic 6: Strategic</p> <p><u>Nominal Criteria:</u></p> <p>Focused on broad, long term goals</p>	<p>EPAP Characteristic 6: Tactical</p> <p><u>Nominal Criteria:</u></p> <p>Focuses on current, short term and specific outcomes and objectives</p>
<p>CPAP Characteristic 7: Normative</p> <p><u>Nominal Criteria:</u></p> <p>Historical and Traditional Standardizing: Establishes Expectations, <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evaluative: What Should be Done </p>	<p>EPAP Characteristic 7: Descriptive</p> <p><u>Nominal Criteria:</u></p> <p>Chronicles current organizational successes Reports without evaluation</p>

Based on:

Ronald C. Moe (2004, 2001, 1994, 1990, 1987)
Moe and Gilmour (1995)
Al Gore and The National Performance Review (1993)

Table 2

**A Sample of the Data Indicators
Coding the Circulars**

Constitutionalist Public Administration Paradigm								
Theo- retically Based	Values Driven	Structure Dependent		Promotes Sector Distinctions		Deductive	Strategic	Normative
		Governmental Structure Dependent	Organizational Structure Dependent	Public Sector	Private Sector			
CTB	CVD	CGSD	COSD	CPUS	CPRS	CD	CS	CN
	<u>Democratic</u> Act on the public's behalf Public interest Individual freedom and initiative National interest	<u>3 branches of government</u> References to the 3 branches of government, their processes, & publications President's memorandum Executive order Required by law	References to political accountability: Heads of Department Delegations or nondelegations of authority from department head References to hierarchical organizational structure	Government Public Government function Inherently governmental function Government consumption For government use	Civilian employees Current market value Corporate incomes Private enterprise Free enterprise economic system	Builds on For the purpose of Should not be started unless savings are sufficient Under this general principle	Agency's basic program Agency's basic mission Agency's essential program Mission need Mission essential	Statements of government policy Related to government policy: Rely on Retain Aim <u>Historical</u> Restates Existing requirement

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Entrepreneurial Public Administration Paradigm								
Pragmatically Based		Results Driven	Structure Independent		Promotes Sector Blurring	Inductive	Tactical	Descriptive
Works Better	Costs Less		Gov. Structure Independent	Organizational Structure Independent				
EWB	ECL	ERD	EGSI	EOSI	EPSB	EI	ET	ED
Lessen the burden of work	References to economic when it means thrifty:	Precise work statements		GOCO	Contracts	Is the result of	One time activity	Usually involve
Simplicity	Purposes of economy	Scope of work		Government corporation	Contractors	Resulting from	of short duration	Comprehen. review
Realistic	Aim for economy	Level of performance		Public-private partnerships	Bids	Based on		
In a timely manner	Most economical performance	Program planning		Public-public partnerships	Preparing, soliciting, and evaluating competitive bid invitations, bids, or proposals			
Most efficient performance	Descriptions of economic impact:	Performance standards		High performing organization				
Accomplish ing the work more efficiently	Removal or withholding of property from tax rolls	Establish. of perf. goals and priorities		Internal management reviews	Negotiating, awarding, managing, and monitoring contracts			
	Reduction	Incentives		Reorganization				
		Performance evaluation		Transfer of work				

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Table 2 Key for Column Headings

Constitutional Public Administration Paradigm

- CTB Constitutionalist Theoretically Based
- CVD Constitutionalist Values Driven
- CSD Constitutionalist Structure Dependent
 - CGSD Constitutionalist Governmental Structure Dependent
 - COSD Constitutionalist Organizational Structure Dependent
- CPSD Constitutionalist Promotes Sector Distinctions
 - CPUS Constitutionalist Promotes Public Sector Distinction
 - CPRS Constitutionalist Promotes Private Sector Distinction
- CD Constitutionalist Deductive
- CS Constitutionalist Strategic
- CN Constitutionalist Normative

Entrepreneurial Public Administration Paradigm

- EPB Entrepreneurial Pragmatically Based
 - EWB Entrepreneurial Works Better
 - ECL Entrepreneurial Costs Less
- ERD Entrepreneurial Results Driven
- ESI Entrepreneurial Structure Independent
 - EGSI Entrepreneurial Governmental Structure Independent
 - EGOI Entrepreneurial Organizational Structure Independent
- EPSB Entrepreneurial Promotes Sector Blurring
- EI Entrepreneurial Inductive
- ET Entrepreneurial Tactical
- ED Entrepreneurial Descriptive

Table 2 gives a *sample* of the data indicators used when coding the circulars.

Table 2 groups the specific phrases and categories of phrases that were found in the text and coded as evidence of the data indicators of the nominal criteria that describe the 7 characteristics of each paradigm in the analytical framework.

Table 3

**Data Analysis
Public Administration Paradigm Predominance**

			CPAP Characteristics							EPAP Characteristics						
Circular	CPAP	EPAP	CTB	CVD	CSD	CPSD	CD	CS	CN	EPB	ERD	ESI	EPSB	EI	ET	ED
1966	77%	23%		-	x	x	x	x	x	x	-					
1967	75%	25%		-	x	x	x	x	x	x	-					
1979	75%	25%		-	x	x	x	x	x	x	-					
1983	87%	13%		-	x	x	-	x	x	x	-			-		
1999	83%	17%		-	x	x	-	x	x	x	-			-		
2003	79%	21%		-	x	-		-	x	x	-		-	x	-	

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Paradigm Predominance

Key for Column Headings

CPAP	Constitutionalist Public Administration Paradigm
EPAP	Entrepreneurial Public Administration Paradigm

- A Circular is reported as indicating evidence of a predominant paradigm when 75% or more of phrases reveal that paradigm.
- Both public administration paradigms are concluded to be present when 26% to 74% of phrases reflect one of the paradigms.
- A Circular may indicate overall evidence of one public administration paradigm while showing evidence of a characteristic of the alternate paradigm.

Characteristic Predominance

Key for Table Cell Entries

x	Characteristic Predominance
--	No Characteristic Predominance
Blank Cell	The corresponding characteristic in the alternate paradigm is predominant

Key for Column Headings

Characteristics of the Constitutionalist Public Administration Paradigm

CTB	Constitutionalist Theoretically Based
CVD	Constitutionalist Values Driven
CSD	Constitutionalist Structure Dependent
CPSD	Constitutionalist Promotes Sector Distinctions
CD	Constitutionalist Deductive
CS	Constitutionalist Strategic
CN	Constitutionalist Normative

Characteristics of the Entrepreneurial Public Administration Paradigm


EPB	Entrepreneurial Pragmatically Based
ERD	Entrepreneurial Results Driven
ESI	Entrepreneurial Structure Independent
EPSB	Entrepreneurial Promotes Sector Blurring
EI	Entrepreneurial Inductive
ET	Entrepreneurial Tactical
ED	Entrepreneurial Descriptive

- A characteristic is reported as predominant when 75% or more of the data was found in one characteristic.
- The Circular is reported as being influenced by both characteristics when 26% to 74% of entries reflect a characteristic.

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- The Circular is reported as showing no characteristic when no phrases for either characteristic were found.

Chart 1
Public Administration Paradigm Predominance



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