The regulation and politics of transborder dataflows

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Abstract
Contrary to initial hopes, the increased economic, social-cultural and political importance of cyberspace has led to substantial state regulation of it. Since nation states are still the dominant force here, the regulation of transborder data flows requires the cooperation of nation states which encounters many difficulties. These problems can be analysed along two dimensions: on the one hand, there are competing interests in the field of transborder data flows: economic interests centre on issues like cost-effectiveness; safety interests focus on the reduction of risk and the prevention of misuse; and civil liberty interests call for the upholding of privacy and freedom of information. On the other hand, national environments differ considerably, especially with respect to the values that inform political debate; the direction and mobilisation of interests; and the existence of institutions in relevant areas such as data protection.

This paper uses these two dimensions to analyse two illustrative cases: one is the “Safe Harbor” agreement between the U.S. and the EU that was meant to provide a framework for firms in the face of different standards of private sector data protection between the two areas; the other is the recent dispute between the U.S. and the EU about the transmission of airline passengers’ personal data. The paper argues that these cases demonstrate that initial expectations for a “policy transfer” of EU privacy standards to the U.S. did not materialise, and that differences in institutions and underlying values can largely account for this.
1 Introduction

This paper\(^1\) analyses the politics of transborder data flows in a transatlantic perspective by looking at two case studies related to the issue of privacy and data protection: on the one hand the agreement between the United States and the European Union to bridge the differences in privacy approaches in e-commerce (“Safe Harbor”), and on the other hand the dispute between the same two actors about the handing over of passenger name records (PNR) in transatlantic flights originating in the European Union. After an introductory part that looks at aspects of the development of state regulation of transborder data flows, the paper describes the two policy episodes in some detail, with a focus on initial positions and the outcome of the negotiations. In the analytical part, the paper attempts to offer an explanation for the differences in the outcomes of the two case studies. Differences in the “framing” of issues between the actors as well as differences in interests play a role, but both are influenced by deeply rooted differences in the conceptualisation of privacy. The paper thus offers additional explanatory variables over the prevailing “constructivist” perspective on negotiations about transborder data flows which we claim cannot account for the outcome of the conflict over passenger name records.

2 Regulating the Internet

While the internet today is undoubtedly of major importance for transactions of a commercial nature (“e-commerce”), its origins are quite different. In the early 1970s, DARPA (a branch of the U.S. Department of Defense) initiated work on a decentralised communication network that would be resistant to a massive attack, and in the mid-1980s the U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF) initiated further development of a backbone communication infrastructure primarily for research purposes, linking major national research sites and their networks into what eventually became known as the “internet”.\(^2\) Development and use were driven by a relatively small community of experts, and consequently little regulation was necessary. What rules there were emanated from egalitarian discussion processes, relations were largely based on trust, and what little hierarchies there were on recognized expertise.

In the early 1990s, when internet use became more widespread under such terms as “information superhighway” or “Global Information Infrastructure” (GII), the founding generation of the internet dreamt of a future without state influence and regulation on this communication tool that began to span the globe. Organisations like the “Electronic Frontier Foundation” (EFF), set up by technologists and exponents of the counter-culture in 1990, deliberately invoked myths of the founding fathers of the United States when they claimed to stand at a “digital frontier”, fighting to protect rights online. Their utopian idea was that of the new medium as a tool for world improvement and liberty, free from imposed regulation. As John Perry Barlow, a founding member of the EFF and sometime lyricist for the 1960s cult band The Grateful Dead put it in exemplary fashion in a “Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace” in 1996, when commercialisation
and imposed regulation threatened to alter the free-wheeling spirit that had prevailed until then:

“Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you of the past to leave us alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather.

We have no elected government, nor are we likely to have one, so I address you with no greater authority than that with which liberty itself always speaks. I declare the global social space we are building to be naturally independent of the tyrannies you seek to impose on us. You have no moral right to rule us nor do you possess any methods of enforcement we have true reason to fear.”

However eloquently stated, this and other comparable manifestos could do little to prevent the eventual imposition of state regulation upon “cyberspace”. The reason is that the internet simply became too important for states to ignore because it interfered with their rules and laws – in many ways. In 1996, for example, U.S. based Playboy magazine was granted an order from a court in New York against a company based in Italy that had created an internet site featuring the name Playmen on the grounds that – since the website was accessible to viewers in the United States – this constituted a violation of a judgement from 1981 that had banned the Italian company from distributing its Playmen magazine in the United States on trademark grounds. The Italian company was ordered to revise its internet site so that all subscription requests from potential United States customers would be denied. In 2000, a French court ruled that the U.S. based internet company Yahoo! had to prevent French citizens from accessing auction sites that were selling Nazi and Ku Klux Klan memorabilia, because a French law prohibits the selling or display of anything that incites racism. Similarly, Germany exerted pressure on the U.S. based auction site eBay not to sell Nazi memorabilia – even though in the United States it is legal to do so for freedom of speech considerations. Both companies eventually complied with the requests, although Yahoo! first sought a ruling from a U.S. court that the French judgement was not enforceable, only to then ban all its customers from buying or selling Nazi paraphernalia, because a French law prohibits this move had nothing to do with the legal threats from France (which included a fine of 100,000 French francs per day of non-compliance). Complying, both Yahoo! and eBay had probably calculated that they stood to lose more from adverse PR and legal costs than they profited from the respective sales, and that they could gain more from concentrating on the sale of non-controversial goods and the growth of their business in both the United States and Europe.

Indeed, e-commerce has been among the fastest growing business areas over the last decade: retail e-commerce in the United States grew at a rate of 28.1% in the first quarter of 2004, when total retail only grew by 8.8%; internet sales in the EU totalled $86 bn. in 2001, and U.S. consumers are expected to spend $120 bn. in 2004; total e-commerce,
which also includes business-to-business transactions, amounted in the United States to $1080 bn. in 2001, and to $430 bn. in the European Union. 

Given this degree of economic volume, access to each other’s e-commerce markets was of great importance to both the United States and the European Union. But the problem of divergent laws and regulations became ever more pressing in the new context of commerce in cyberspace, as cross-border transactions made the mismatch between boundless economic space and territorially based jurisdictions very clear. And since much of e-commerce is concerned with the exchange of information, this was particularly acute in the area of privacy and data protection, where substantially different approaches to regulation had been employed on both sides of the Atlantic.

In the United States, privacy protection through statutory law is not very highly developed. Although there is a long-standing debate about the subject, starting in the late 19th century with the pathbreaking contribution by Warren and Brandeis (1890), the legal situation has been characterized by experts as a “patchwork quilt” (Holvast et al. 1999: USA-1), “at best a thin patchwork” (Froomkin 2000: 1539) or as “fragmented, ad hoc and narrowly targeted to cover specific sectors and concerns” (Shaffer 1999: 422). With no comprehensive privacy legislation in place and unwilling to produce one, yet in recognition of the fact that privacy protection is imperative if e-commerce is to succeed, the United States approach focused on self-regulation by the industry. As the “Framework for Global Electronic Commerce”, co-authored by President Clinton and Vice-President Gore and published by the White House in July 1997, put it:

“Americans treasure privacy, linking it to our concept of personal freedom and well-being. Unfortunately, the GII’s great promise – that it facilitates the collection, re-use, and instantaneous transmission of information – can, if not managed carefully, diminish personal privacy. It is essential, therefore, to assure personal privacy in the networked environment if people are to feel comfortable doing business.

[...]
The Administration supports private sector efforts now underway to implement meaningful, consumer-friendly, self-regulatory privacy regimes. These include mechanisms for facilitating awareness and the exercise of choice online, evaluating private sector adoption of and adherence to fair information practices, and dispute resolution.” (Clinton and Gore 1997)

In Europe, the approach taken was quite different. Beginning in the early 1970s, countries such as Germany, Sweden, France, and Denmark had started to introduce legislation on “data protection”, and this had spread across the continent. The legislation aimed to prevent threats to privacy emanating from the introduction of computer based technologies – such as vast databases – and was focused on the right to protect one’s own data. National data privacy protection regimes varied across the member states of the European Union, however, which could be a potential obstacle for trade between them and hamper the development of e-commerce.

As a consequence, the European Union “Directive 95/46/ EU on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and the Free Movement of
Such Data” was passed in October 1995 after five years of negotiations and entered into force in October 1998. While the Directive makes it clear that henceforth “given the equivalent protection resulting from the approximation of national laws, the Member States will no longer be able to inhibit the free movement between them of personal data on grounds relating to the protection of the rights and freedoms of individuals, and in particular the right to privacy” (preamble section 9), it also introduced regulations that made transfer of such data to third countries (i.e. outside the European Union) dependent on “an adequate level of protection” there (article 25). In other words, while facilitating trade within the EU, the Directive could become a serious obstacle to electronic commerce with countries outside Europe (such as the United States), if their level of privacy protection was judged to be not adequate.

3 Transatlantic privacy dispute I: e-commerce and the “Safe Harbor” agreement

Given the amount of trade and economic interdependence between the EU and the United States, one would expect negotiations about the topic of transatlantic data flows to have been taken up immediately after the Data Protection Directive had been passed in 1995. However, that was not the case. Rather, the initial U.S. reaction was quite nonchalant, assuming that the exemption clauses of article 26 of the Directive would leave data flows unimpeded. Real discussions only started in the first half of 1998 when the U.S. administration realised that this might not be the case.

Initially both sides took negotiation positions that can be described as insisting on their own approaches and demanding from the other side to adopt that. EU officials suggested they would only be satisfied if the United States introduced appropriate formal legislation and authorities to protect privacy. The United States further pursued its strategy, laid down in the “Framework”, to rely on independent privacy auditing agencies that would award seals for websites, and White House e-commerce policy architect Ira Magaziner expressed hope that spreading this approach internationally would diffuse the disagreement with the European Union. Take-up of this approach, however, was very low even in the United States themselves: hardly any companies applied to agencies like TRUSTe or BBBOnline for their seal, which reinforced the EU Commission’s skepticism about the unworkability of the American approach of self regulation.

Both sides’ positions seemed incompatible at that time, and it was hard to see how a compromise could be reached. But the increasingly tense situation started to induce some movement. U.S. industry began to recognize that the EU was chiefly concerned with the lack of an enforcement mechanism in U.S. self regulation, and together with U.S. policymakers’ threats that legislation would not be ruled out if take-up rates of the certification mechanisms remained low, this started to change the situation. In addition, the federal government started to step up the enforcement of regulations on unfair or deceptive company privacy principles.

The logjam in the negotiations was only overcome, however, when the American lead negotiator David Aaron suggested the concept of a “safe harbor”, i.e. a set of principles
**Notice:** Organizations must notify individuals about the purposes for which they collect and use information about them. They must provide information about how individuals can contact the organization with any inquiries or complaints, the types of third parties to which it discloses the information and the choices and means the organization offers for limiting its use and disclosure.

**Choice:** Organizations must give individuals the opportunity to choose (opt out) whether their personal information will be disclosed to a third party or used for a purpose incompatible with the purpose for which it was originally collected or subsequently authorized by the individual. For sensitive information, affirmative or explicit (opt in) choice must be given if the information is to be disclosed to a third party or used for a purpose other than its original purpose or the purpose authorized subsequently by the individual.

**Onward Transfer** (Transfers to Third Parties): To disclose information to a third party, organizations must apply the notice and choice principles. Where an organization wishes to transfer information to a third party that is acting as an agent, it may do so if it makes sure that the third party subscribes to the safe harbor principles or is subject to the Directive or another adequacy finding. As an alternative, the organization can enter into a written agreement with such third party requiring that the third party provide at least the same level of privacy protection as is required by the relevant principles.

**Access:** Individuals must have access to personal information about them that an organization holds and be able to correct, amend, or delete that information where it is inaccurate, except where the burden or expense of providing access would be disproportionate to the risks to the individual’s privacy in the case in question, or where the rights of persons other than the individual would be violated.

**Security:** Organizations must take reasonable precautions to protect personal information from loss, misuse and unauthorized access, disclosure, alteration and destruction.

**Data integrity:** Personal information must be relevant for the purposes for which it is to be used. An organization should take reasonable steps to ensure that data is reliable for its intended use, accurate, complete, and current.

**Enforcement:** In order to ensure compliance with the safe harbor principles, there must be (a) readily available and affordable independent recourse mechanisms so that each individual’s complaints and disputes can be investigated and resolved and damages awarded where the applicable law or private sector initiatives so provide; (b) procedures for verifying that the commitments companies make to adhere to the safe harbor principles have been implemented; and (c) obligations to remedy problems arising out of a failure to comply with the principles. Sanctions must be sufficiently rigorous to ensure compliance by the organization. Organizations that fail to provide annual self certification letters will no longer appear in the list of participants and safe harbor benefits will no longer be assured.

**Table 1: Safe Harbor principles**

to which companies would be able to subscribe and which would be considered “adequate” under the EU Directive. This proposal transformed the negotiations, because it pointed out a way how EU substantive concerns about privacy protection could be
achieved without the United States having to pass comprehensive privacy legislation and setting up respective institutions. While some EU member states remained skeptical, an agreement was eventually reached between the United States and the European Commission along the lines suggested by Aaron. Companies would be able to self-certify annually that they met the agreed set of seven privacy principles (see Table 1) on data protection issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce. The Federal Trade Commission would maintain a list of complying organisations on its website, and failure to comply would be actionable under the Federal Trade Commission Act. In return, the European Commission issued a finding of adequacy of this procedure under the Data Protection Directive.

The “safe harbor” agreement was thus neither a recognition of the previous U.S. system by the European Union, nor was it an extension of the EU system of formal legislation combined with state privacy commissioners. Rather it is qualitatively different from both and a new system that was hailed by many observers as particularly adequate for the conditions of incongruity between economic and political space and the problem of regulatory spill-over across jurisdictions.

4 Transatlantic privacy dispute II: Terrorism and Passenger Name Records

But if hopes had been expressed that the “safe harbor” solution would be a model of future solutions for problems of this kind (see, for instance, Farrell (2003: 297)), then such assessments will likely have to be reevaluated in the light of another, more recent, dispute between the two parties, namely that about airline passenger name records or PNRs.

A PNR is a file created by an airline for each journey a passenger books, is usually held in a Computerized Reservation System (CRS) and contains the name of the traveler, details of flights, hotels, car rentals, and other travel services. But it can also contain residential and business postal and e-mail addresses as well as phone numbers, credit card details, and names and personal information of emergency contacts. Furthermore, through billing, meeting, and discount eligibility codes, PNRs also contain information about memberships and organizational affiliations, they can contain religious meal preferences and details on physical and medical conditions. PNRs must therefore be regarded as sensitive personal information.

After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States decided to use PNR data in their fight against terrorism. On 19 November 2001, Congress passed the “Aviation and Security Act” which required airlines operating passenger flights to, from or through the United States, to provide the U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) before take-off or at least 15 minutes after departure with electronic access to PNR data contained in their reservation and departure control systems. Since PNRs contain personal data, this fell under the EU Data Protection Directive and thus required negotiations between both sides.

After a provisional agreement in March 2003 – allowing European carriers to provide
PNRs without being penalised in the EU for this – negotiations took place throughout 2003 between the European Commission’s Directorate-General for the Internal Market (which is responsible for data protection) and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security about these data transfers. The goal of the U.S. side was set out in a State Department document as negotiating “an agreement with the EU that gives CBP and TSA [Transportation Security Administration, A.B.] permanent access to PNR data” after which such access should be won on a global basis. In other words, complete access to foreign PNR data should be granted, without any control. The EU found these demands unacceptable, as its Internal Market commissioner Frits Bolkestein made clear repeatedly. In a speech given before the European Parliament’s Civil Liberties committee on 9 September 2003 he declared that so far the Commission could not regard the requirements of “adequate protection” under the Data Protection Directive to have been met and pointed out four principal shortcomings in the negotiations up to then:

- that the U.S. was not prepared to limit the use of PNRs to terrorism and terrorism-related crimes;
- that 39 PNR elements were required by the U.S. which was “not proportionate to the purpose”;
- that the U.S. still demanded a very long PNR data storage period of 6 to 7 years;
- and that there was “insufficient legal bindingness of the U.S. undertakings” (i.e. that the rights agreed were not actionable before U.S. courts).

After further negotiations, however, Bolkestein announced on 16 December 2003 that a compromise had been reached. The European Commission issued an “adequacy ruling” on 14 May 2004, and two weeks later an agreement was signed between both sides in Washington. Testing it against the criteria Bolkestein had set out six months ago makes clear that the U.S. side largely prevailed with its demands:

- PNR data could be used for “preventing and combating: 1. terrorism and related crimes; 2. other serious crimes, including organised crime, that are transnational in nature; and 3. flight from warrants or custody for the crimes described above”;
- 34 PNR elements would be transmitted (see Table 2);
- PNR data storage would be for 3.5 years, after which data which had not been accessed during that period would be destroyed, but other data kept for an additional 8 years;
- complaints about the handling of PNRs could be made “in writing” to the Chef Privacy Officer of the Department of Homeland Security who “will review the situation and endeavour to resolve the complaint”.

Furthermore, the data given to the CBP can be shared within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which is a vast umbrella organisation encompassing 22 formerly
1. PNR record locator code
2. Date of reservation
3. Date(s) of intended travel
4. Name
5. Other names on PNR
6. Address
7. All forms of payment information
8. Billing address
9. Contact telephone numbers
10. All travel itinerary for specific PNR
11. Frequent flyer information (limited to miles flown and address(es))
12. Travel agency
13. Travel agent
14. Code share PNR information
15. Travel status of passenger
16. Split/divided PNR information
17. E-mail address
18. Ticketing field information
19. General remarks
20. Ticket number
21. Seat number
22. Date of ticket issuance
23. No show history
24. Bag tag numbers
25. Go show information
26. OSI information
27. SSI/SSR information
28. Received from information
29. All historical changes to the PNR
30. Number of travellers on PNR
31. Seat information
32. One-way tickets
33. Any collected APIS (Advanced Passenger Information System) information
34. ATFQ (Automatic Ticketing Fare Quote) fields

Table 2: PNR data elements required by CBP from air carriers (Source: EU website)
independent federal agencies (including the CBP) with more than 170,000 employees (Kettl 2004). Assurances by the DHS against “bulk sharing” of data with other federal agencies are thus of questionable value.

Consequently, the agreement met criticism from the working party of EU national data protection officers and from the European Parliament, which had already been very critical of the provisional agreement for PNR transfer and had voted with 445 to 31 (with 21 abstentions) in October 2003 to bring the PNR transfer into line with EU data protection legislation. In June 2004 the European Parliament consequently decided to ask the Court of Justice of the European Communities to annul both the agreement and the adequacy finding.

5 Analysis: Why do the outcomes differ?

Comparing the two policy episodes, we find striking differences in outcomes. While the result of the “safe harbor” case can be described as a constructive compromise, it is difficult to see the outcome of the PNR episode as anything else than a thinly veiled victory for the American side – a view supported by the court action sought by the European Parliament. How can this be explained?

Political science analyses of transborder data flows between the U.S. and the EU have so far focused on the “safe harbor” case and have primarily analysed it from a “constructivist” viewpoint. This perspective emphasizes the importance of values, norms, and discourse over conventional, “realist” analyses of power. With respect to the “safe harbor” case, it has been claimed that, especially under conditions of comparable power, dialogue can break logjam, prevent both domination by one side or the decline into (trade) conflict, and that persuasion and argument can achieve results that cannot be explained by conventional bargaining theory. Faced with a difficult negotiating situation, the analysis goes, “[t]hrough a process of argument, [the U.S. and the EU] succeeded in discovering new possibilities of action, reaching a provisional understanding about a new institutional approach to resolving the vexing dispute over privacy regulation, which may be applied to other areas of e-commerce.” (Farrell 2003: 302).

However much this may indeed have been the case in the “safe harbor” case, it is difficult to see how the same claims can be made in the PNR case – and therefore be generalizable for disputes about transborder data flows. In the latter, far from there being persuasion and argument, quite clearly the United States prevailed in the conflict, achieving their goal of unhindered access to passenger name records without effective control by the European side over their further use.

To enhance our understanding of the differences between the two cases, further distinctions therefore need to be introduced, and additional variables need to be investigated for their explanatory potential.

The issue of transborder data flows can be approached from different viewpoints, and different actors can take different positions with respect to these viewpoints. In social science terminology we can say that they “frame” issues in different ways. Frames are the underlying structures of beliefs, perceptions and appreciations on which policy positions
rest, and these frames determine what counts as a fact and what arguments are taken to be relevant and compelling (Rein and Schön 1993; Schön and Rein 1994). For the issue of transborder data flows, three different frames can be hypothesized to exist: one can be labelled “economic interests” and focuses on questions of cost effectiveness, profit and market extension; another one can be labelled “safety interests” and is concerned with such things as reduction of risk and prevention of misuse; and a third one can probably be best described as “civil liberty interests” and centres on such issues as privacy and freedom of information.

The two cases described above, we argue here, fell into two different issue areas, namely business and safety, and the participating actors approached them with distinctive and different frames. In the e-commerce case, the American side used an economic interest frame, while the European Commission used a mix of economic and civil liberty frames. The compromise of “safe harbour” was closer to the European position as it took considerations from each frame into account. In the PNR case, the American side again used a pure “safety interests” frame, with disregard to other considerations, while the European actors used safety and civil liberties frames, but in different measures: the European Parliament’s “dose” of civil liberties was clearly greater than the European Commission’s, and since the solution found so far reflects the American preferences more clearly, the difference between the European Commission’s and the Parliament’s perspective became quite substantial, leading to the European Parliament’s court action.

Having established that the two cases of transborder data flows led to the actors using different frames – which in itself can account for some difference –, we can go on to look at variables beyond discourse that might shed more light on the reasons for the differences in outcomes. They will be differences in interests, differences in values, and differences in institutions.

Looking at differences in interests between the actors, we find that there are substantial asymmetries in both cases which have likely influenced the outcomes of the respective negotiations – but which have been neglected by constructivist scholars. In the “safe harbor” case, the United States were in a weaker position compared to the European Union, because they had a strong e-commerce industry that was conducting considerable business in Europe. With the EU its largest trading partner\(^\text{17}\) and the site of most U.S. foreign investment, with U.S. controlled affiliates depending on information flows, and with an information-related industry ranging from credit card companies eager to expand into Europe to information brokers such as LexisNexis, the United States had a vast interest in resolving the dispute and not letting transatlantic data flows be interrupted. Furthermore, the U.S. could not have retaliated against any EU actions under WTO rules, thus having to shoulder most of the costs of a potential conflict. All these factors will likely have contributed to the United States’ willingness to find a constructive compromise that took the shape of the “safe harbor” agreement.

In the PNR case, strengths and weaknesses were distributed quite differently: here the European Union found itself in the weaker position, being confronted with the threat of a withdrawal of landing rights for European carriers in the United States.\(^\text{18}\) While the EU stresses that it had to keep the interests of 10–11 million transatlantic passengers in mind, this was also a commercial decision. A huge amount of business was at risk,
which might have bankrupted national carriers who would have lost profitable business
to their U.S. competitors. And again, no retaliation would have been possible under
WTO rules. With the odds against them in this case, the European side will likely have
found agreeing to U.S. demands more appealing than fighting for their concept of data
protection on grounds of principle.

A closer inspection of the two policy episodes thus reveals considerable asymmetries.
The assumptions made by constructivist scholars about “comparable” bargaining powers
between both actors in the “safe harbor” case (cf. Long and Quek (2002: 326, 340)) thus
have to be refuted, which also casts doubt on their emphasis of argument and persuasion
as the central explanatory variables of the result. And if asymmetry in that case has
contributed to that outcome, a reverse asymmetry has likely contributed to the result in
the PNR case.

But these differences in interests are not the only explanation for the divergences
in outcome between the “safe harbor” and PNR cases. There are also deeply rooted
value differences concerning privacy, and ongoing differences in institutions between the
European and American sides. Both factors can help us further understand the develop-
ments in this policy area.

As briefly pointed out above, conceptions about privacy differ considerably on both
sides of the Atlantic, and these differences are deeply rooted. If the U.S. legal approach
is akin to a “patchwork”, as quoted above, and almost exclusively directed towards the
public sector, the European approach must be characterized as being comprehensive: its
privacy regulations apply to public and private sectors, they apply to a wide range of
activities, impose affirmative obligations, and they have few, if any, sectoral limitations
(Swire and Litan 1998: 23).

These different approaches reflect fundamentally divergent regulatory philosophies in the sphere of privacy.19 The European approach sees privacy as a fundamental
or human right, which is a precondition for the individual’s autonomy and thus cannot
be traded away. The burden of protection rests not with the individual, but with society.
Explicit statutes and regulatory agencies to oversee enforcement are the chosen mech-
aniisms for this, and protection can be seen as being proactive, not reactive. Historical
experiences with dictatorships such as the Nazis (who used census data for the holocaust)
and repressive regimes in East Europe have sensitized Europeans to the importance of
data protection. The absence of such experiences, combined with a long tradition of
distrust against government, led to a preference for markets and self-regulation in the
area of commerce generally and also privacy in the United States. Privacy is seen as a
property right rather than a human right, a commodity that is tradeable, and the legal
system treats it like private property. Therefore the private sector and free market are
seen as the most effective mechanisms for protecting privacy, with the focus being more
on the consumer than the citizen. Consequently protection is often more reactive than
proactive.

Many scholars expected the existence of the European Data Protection Directive to
lead to a “ratcheting up” of U.S. personal privacy standards through a variety of mechan-
isms such as EU collective action and market clout, firms’ desire to expand their markets
and the constraints of supranational trade rules (see, for example, Regan (1993): Shaf-
fer (1999, 2000)). So far, this has not materialized – there has been no comprehensive privacy legislation, and no institutionalisation in terms of a federal agency or a commissioner for privacy in the United States, and there are currently no plans for such a change. This suggests that the fundamental philosophical differences outlined above – on which it is not really possible to compromise – exert a powerful influence in favour of the status quo that is not easily overcome.

Furthermore, the continuing differences in institutionalisation of privacy matters on both sides of the Atlantic serve as a further reinforcement mechanism for continuing difference. It can probably best be illustrated by the advantages institutional isomorphism might generate: If institutions existed on both sides that had similar remits, they would likely be charged with conducting negotiations about transborder data flow issues, which would facilitate similarity in perspectives and a build-up of trust over repeated interactions in different issue areas. The absence of such an institutional match makes negotiations more difficult because learning is unlikely to take place if each issue is negotiated by a different institution on the American side.

6 Conclusion

This paper has compared two cases of transborder data flows that fall into two different issues areas – business and safety. It has found that transatlantic negotiations over issues of privacy have led to quite different results in the two cases, one resulting in a compromise, while the other seems to have resulted in a substantial acceptance of American demands and a giving in on the part of the European Commission.20

This comes as some surprise – not only because scholars had expected U.S. privacy regulations to be “ratcheted up” as a result of the EU Data Protection Directive (as seen in the previous section), but also because initially political scientists had analysed this policy area as leading to “policy convergence” and learning from each other’s experiences, and had projected these trends to continue into the future (see, e.g. Bennett (1991a, b, 1992)). Similarly, scholars taking a “constructivist” approach to the analysis of international negotiations had pointed out the importance of argument and persuasion in the solution of the case about e-commerce and the “safe harbor” agreement, as seen above.

These claims have now been called into question, and they will need to be reevaluated. This paper has argued that an approach that combines the analysis of “frames” with interests, values and institutions can better account for the differences, explaining both the successful compromise in the “safe harbor” case and the rather one-sided result in the PNR case.

The central focus on interests is also supported by the most recent case of a transatlantic dispute over the use of person-related data that developed in the summer of 2006. It emerged that the U.S. administration had obtained the records of a Belgian cooperative (the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication or SWIFT) that acts as a clearing centre for international banks and routes about $6 trillion every day between banks, brokerages and stock exchanges.21 These records, which had been
obtained in the aftermath of the 9/11 terror attacks in the United States, give insight into financial transactions of individuals and are thus highly relevant for the issue of privacy. While the Bush administration insisted on their importance for national security, arguing that they constituted an important instrument in the fight against terrorism, concerns were voiced in Europe that banking secrets had been broken, and that the data might be used as an instrument of industrial espionage. The European Parliament passed a resolution that warned against that and strongly criticized the U.S. action.

On a more general note, it may be that in the post-9/11 world a “policy window” (Kingdon 1995) has opened for those who pursue a policy aiming to reduce privacy protection, and that this may severely damage all attempts at finding an international regime for privacy and dataflow regulation. Whether such a wide-ranging hypothesis will be supported by future events, only additional research will be able to establish.

Notes

1 This paper contains first results from a larger project the author is undertaking on “The Politics and Governance of Privacy”. It has profited from discussions at the conference “Safety & Security in a Networked World: Balancing Cyber-Rights & Responsibilities”, Oxford Internet Institute, 8.–10. September 2005, and at presentations at the University of Edinburgh, the Free University Berlin, and the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford.

2 For a brief history of the technological development, see e.g. the webpages at http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/ [19 July 2005].

3 Available at http://homes.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html [19 July 2005].

4 More details on this case can be found e.g. at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1032605.stm [19 July 2005] which also gives further links. See also, for a more general analysis of the role of states in regulating the internet, Drezner (2004).


6 More comprehensive comparisons of international privacy regulations can be found in Michael (1994) and Electronic Privacy Information Center and Privacy International (2004).

7 For overviews of the legal developments in Europe see the contribution by Viktor Mayer-Schönberger in the volume edited by Agre and Rotenberg (1997) and Bennett (1992), especially the tables on pp. 57 and 59.

8 This section draws on the descriptions of the “safe harbor” negotiations in Long and Quek (2002), Farrell (2003), Regan (2003), and Kobrin (2004).


10 There are four major CRSs, only one of whom – AMADEUS – is located in the European Union, while the others are in the United States. Information in this section draws on European Parliament Report A6-0226/2005 (4.7.2005), the chapter on travel privacy in Electronic Privacy Information Center and Privacy International (2004), and the “Opinion 6/2002 on transmission of Passenger Manifest Information and other data from Airlines to the United States” by the EU Article 29 Working Group (adopted 24 October 2002).


12 See also his op-ed commentary “Resisting U.S. demands: Passenger privacy and the war on terror” in the International Herald Tribune of 24 October 2003 which makes similar points.

13 The initial U.S. demand had been 50 years.

On 30 May 2006, the European Court annulled both the Council decision concerning the conclusion of the agreement with the United States and the Commission decision on adequacy (cases C-317/04 and C-318/04). However, the Court ruled solely based on the issue of competence, finding that the Council acted without competence in approving the agreement, and that the Commission acted outside its competences in declaring the agreement adequate in terms of the data protection directive. Consequently, the Court did not decide about the Parliament’s claims regarding the substantive issues of breach of the right to privacy and breach of fundamental rights.

Cf. Long and Quek (2002); Farrell (2003); Regan (2003).


The latter assessment is also supported by the stance adopted by the Commission after the ECJ ruling on the PNR case mentioned above. For the Commission did not use the ruling to try to renegotiate the agreement (which might, of course, not have been very successful anyway). Rather, on 19 June 2006, the Commission adopted two initiatives that pledged to renew the agreement, but under the intergovernmental pillar of the Union and using a procedure that would exclude the European Parliament from the decision making process (namely Art. 38 of Title VI of the Treaty on European Union). If that were really carried out, the European Parliament’s victory before the Court would have spectacularly backfired by depriving it of any influence on the agreement. While the Parliament could try to bring the agreement again before the Court on substantive grounds, there are indications – from the Advocate General’s opinion in this case, dating from November 2005 – that these may not have much merit.


See the article in Handelsblatt, Industrispionage statt Antiterrorkampf?, http://www.handelsblatt.com/news/printpage.aspx?_p=200051&_t=ftprint&_b=110583811.07.06 (11.07.06).

See http://www.handelsblatt.com/news/printpage.aspx?_p=200051&_t=ftprint&_b=110583811.07.06 (06.07.06).
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